InstitutsVergV 5.0: New Remuneration Requirements for Financial Institutions

InstitutsVergV 5.0: New Remuneration Requirements for Financial Institutions
  • 11/16/2026
  • Reading time 10 Minutes

New remuneration rules for consumer lending take effect on 20 November 2026. The BRUBEG amendments to the InstitutsVergV have applied since April, backed by an expanded sanctions and enforcement regime.

On 20 November 2026, the consumer lending provisions of the German act implementing the Consumer Credit Directive (EU) 2023/2225 take effect. With them come new requirements under the Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (Institutsvergütungsverordnung, InstitutsVergV) governing pay in loan advisory services and creditworthiness assessments.

For many institutions, this is the moment to review their remuneration systems as a whole. The Banking Directive Implementation and Bureaucracy Relief Act (BRUBEG) of 25 March 2026 had already amended the InstitutsVergV, largely with effect from 1 April 2026, transposing the remuneration provisions of CRD VI. Our previous BRUBEG updates covered ESG risks, third-country branches and the fit and proper requirements for key function holders. This update turns to remuneration.

The changes are not a recast of the InstitutsVergV. Its core architecture remains intact: general and specific requirements, risk taker identification and rules on variable remuneration. The targeted amendments nonetheless matter in practice, and they are reinforced by an expanded supervisory sanctions and enforcement regime. We set out the key changes by topic below.

From 20 November 2026: No Misaligned Incentives in Consumer Lending

With effect from 20 November 2026, Section 5(1) nos. 4 and 5 InstitutsVergV are replaced by nos. 4 to 5a. The requirements previously applied only to immovable property consumer credit agreements. They will now cover all consumer credit agreements within the meaning of Section 491(1) of the German Civil Code (BGB).

Remuneration must not conflict with the duty to act in the borrower’s best interests when providing advisory services under Section 511 BGB, and must not be linked to sales targets for consumer credit agreements. Pay for staff responsible for creditworthiness assessments must not depend on the number or proportion of approved applications. Under no. 5, the remuneration policy must also be aligned with the institution’s business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests, and must include measures to avoid conflicts of interest. Under no. 5a, the remuneration policy for these staff must also be consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

In retail and consumer lending in particular, commission and target systems for sales and credit risk functions must be reviewed now, and any required adjustments implemented by the deadline. Any remaining need for adjustment should be fully identified, documented and addressed without undue delay.

Remuneration Parameters: Timing, Strategic Alignment and ESG

Timing: What the Rule Requires and What Practice Has Accepted

Section 4 sentence 3 InstitutsVergV, as applicable since 1 April 2026, requires remuneration parameters to be set “at the beginning of the assessment period”. They must be aligned with the strategy and support the achievement of strategic objectives. Under sentence 4, ESG risks must also be taken into account. Communication to staff remains governed by Section 13(1) InstitutsVergV: staff must be informed in writing (including electronically) of the remuneration parameters relevant to them. The provision sets no express deadline. The ministerial draft had required parameters to be set “before the beginning” of the period; following criticism from industry associations, the final text refers to “at the beginning“.

In its 2018 Interpretative Guidance, Bafin already required remuneration parameters to be set at the beginning of an assessment period and not to be changed retrospectively. That administrative practice continues to apply unless superseded by the InstitutsVergV FAQs. Some market participants have inferred that, for annual targets, setting and communicating parameters within the first quarter may suffice. Neither the Interpretative Guidance nor the FAQs, however, provide for a quarterly window. The legislator views the new rule as codifying existing supervisory practice, not as endorsing any particular deadline.

Uncertainties remain. Neither the rule nor the FAQs define what “at the beginning” means in time. Whether supervisors will continue to accept a quarterly window now that the requirement has the force of a regulation has not been authoritatively settled. The treatment of mid-year joiners, role changes and shorter reference periods (such as spot bonuses) is also open; for these, at least the catalogue of discretionary criteria should be fixed at the start of the financial year. Institutions should therefore complete target-setting as early as possible and document it in full.

ESG Risks Become an Express Part of Remuneration Management

Under Section 4 sentence 4 InstitutsVergV (new version), ESG risks must be taken into account when setting remuneration parameters. According to the explanatory memorandum, the specific design is a matter for each institution; ESG risks need not be reflected in individual performance contributions. The key reference points remain the business and risk strategy, which must incorporate ESG risks under Section 26c of the German Banking Act (KWG) (new version), and the ESG risk plan under Section 26d KWG.

In addition, Section 5(1) no. 1a InstitutsVergV requires performance-related remuneration to take account of financial and non-financial criteria, including those under Section 4 sentence 4. In substance, this builds on the Bafin FAQs, under which material ESG risks must be reflected in the remuneration system, for example through sustainability targets as remuneration parameters. What is new is the express codification and, with it, a heavier documentation burden.

Governance: Supervisory Body, Risk Takers and Group Level

Supervisory Body Brought into Risk Taker Identification

Under Section 3(1) sentence 3 InstitutsVergV (new version), the obligations under Section 3(1) sentences 1 and 2 (management’s reporting to the administrative or supervisory body at least annually, and the chair’s right to information) also apply to the process for identifying risk takers under Section 25a(5b) KWG. For institutions within Section 1(3) InstitutsVergV, namely significant institutions and the other CRR credit institutions covered there, this extends to the process for identifying group risk takers under Section 27(2) sentences 1 and 3 InstitutsVergV. The Bundesrat called for this extension to be dropped, without success. Significant institutions must also inform identified risk takers of their classification without undue delay under Section 25a(5b) sentence 4 KWG.

Group Level and Classification as a Qualifying Non-Significant Institution

Since the BRUBEG amendments took effect, Section 1(1) sentence 3 InstitutsVergV also requires parent undertakings in the form of (mixed) (EU) parent financial holding companies to apply Section 27(1) to (5) InstitutsVergV, meaning they must set a group-wide remuneration strategy and monitor its implementation. In addition, an institution is now classified as a qualifying non-significant institution under Section 1(3) sentence 2 no. 2(c) InstitutsVergV if it exceeds either of the two derivatives thresholds (2% or 5%). Previously, both thresholds had to be met cumulatively. This corrects a transposition error relative to Article 4(1)(145) CRR. CRR institutions with average total assets exceeding EUR 5 billion should review their classification and, with it, whether the risk taker requirements apply.

Breaches Get Costlier: Administrative Fines and Coercive Penalties

Administrative fines: The BRUBEG introduced a dedicated catalogue of fines for remuneration breaches in Section 56(2) nos. 11a to 11d KWG, now part of the KWG as in force. It covers exceeding the cap on variable remuneration (Section 25a(5) sentence 2 KWG), failing to notify risk takers or notifying them late (Section 25a(5b) sentence 4 KWG), failing to file an application under Section 25a(5c) KWG or filing it late, and failing to appoint the required members of the remuneration control committee (Section 25d(12) sentence 2 or 3 KWG). Fines of up to EUR 5 million may be imposed (Section 56(6) no. 1 KWG).

In cases under nos. 11b to 11d, persistent breaches may attract a fine above the Section 56(6) limit under Section 56(6b) KWG. For legal persons and associations of persons, the cap is the higher of EUR 5 million or 10% of total turnover. In cases covered by Section 56(6d) KWG, the fine may also reach up to twice the economic benefit derived from the breach. Breaches of the individual substantive requirements of the InstitutsVergV, by contrast, are not directly subject to fines. They are enforced primarily through supervisory measures under Section 45 KWG and through coercive measures. Investment firms are subject to separate rules under the WpIG and the WpIVergV.

Coercive penalties: Bafin orders, such as an order to adjust a remuneration system, can be enforced under Section 17(1) FinDAG in conjunction with the Administrative Enforcement Act (VwVG) through coercive fines of up to EUR 2.5 million. This requires an enforceable order and a prior warning.

Section 50 KWG introduces a new periodic penalty payment. It may be imposed for an ongoing breach of the KWG, the statutory instruments issued under it (including the InstitutsVergV), the CRR or enforceable Bafin orders. It runs from the date set by Bafin until the breach ends, for a maximum of six months; retroactive imposition is excluded. The daily amount is up to EUR 50,000 for natural persons and up to 5% of average daily net turnover for legal persons and partnerships with legal capacity. Besides the institution itself, it may be imposed on managing directors, members of the administrative or supervisory body, key function holders, risk takers and any other natural person responsible for the breach.

The expanded sanctions toolkit significantly raises the stakes for robust remuneration governance. Institutions should not only review the substantive remuneration requirements but also clearly define responsibilities, deadlines and processes for promptly remedying identified deficiencies. A sanction can also feed back into remuneration itself: under the Bafin FAQs, a fine under Section 56 KWG of 1% of own funds or more counts as a “material“ regulatory sanction and may justify a negative performance contribution.

Auditors and Supervisors Are Looking More Closely

Audit requirements for remuneration systems are set out in Section 12 of the Audit Report Regulation (PrüfbV). The PrüfbV was last amended by Article 13 BRUBEG, which left Section 12 PrüfbV unchanged. The current provision already requires the auditor to assess the appropriateness and transparency of remuneration systems and their alignment with the institution’s sustainable development. This includes the appropriateness of the ratio between variable and fixed remuneration, including the cap set for it. The auditor must also assess whether remuneration systems and parameters are aligned with the institution’s strategic objectives.

The draft Second Ordinance Amending the PrüfbV, on which Bafin consulted in 2025 (draft as of 7 April 2025), would significantly expand audit obligations. Under the draft, the auditor would also have to assess the gender neutrality of remuneration systems, the process and results of risk taker identification, and the accuracy of the institution’s classification. The draft also adds more specific audit duties on ex ante and ex post risk adjustment of variable remuneration. The amending ordinance has not yet been adopted, so the proposed extensions are not yet law.

For supervisory interpretation, the EBA Guidelines on sound remuneration policies (EBA/GL/2021/04) remain authoritative. Bafin has adopted them into its administrative practice, with the exception of paragraphs 55, 90 and 296.

What Should Institutions Do Now?

The changes taking effect on 20 November 2026 require immediate action. They are also a good opportunity for a structured review of remuneration systems as a whole. In particular, we recommend the following:

  • Immediately, and by 20 November 2026 at the latest: review remuneration and target systems in consumer lending sales and creditworthiness assessment for sales and approval incentives, and adjust them as needed.
  • Translate ESG risks from the risk inventory and the ESG risk plan into remuneration parameters, and balance financial and non-financial criteria.
  • Extend reporting to the supervisory body to cover the risk taker identification process, check classification as a qualifying non-significant institution, and review the group-wide remuneration strategy.
  • By the start of the next assessment period at the latest: schedule and document the target-setting process so that remuneration parameters are demonstrably fixed at the beginning, and ensure a timely, documented communication process under Section 13(1) InstitutsVergV.
  • Update organisational policies, employment and service agreements, and the annual appropriateness review under Section 12 InstitutsVergV.
  • Align remuneration governance with the expanded sanctions and enforcement tools: allocate responsibilities, monitor deadlines for risk taker notifications and applications, and embed processes for the prompt remediation of identified deficiencies.

We would be pleased to support you in analysing your remuneration systems and implementing the new requirements. Please get in touch.

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Authors of this article

Dr. Theofanis Tacou, LL.M.

Partner

Attorney-at-Law (Rechtsanwalt), Specialist Lawyer in Labor Law, Dikigoros

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